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The Wonderful World of Privileges
- The Par Condicio Creditorum vs. Closeout-Netting
by
Christoph G. Paulus*
Speaking about privileges arouses sentiments which are not necessarily without ambivalence.
Even though the primary connotation might be positive, a closer look reveals that there are
also downsides. That, here too, the coin consists of two sides is most prominently evidenced by
the well known term ‘privilegium odiosum’ which indicates that the one’s elevation is (or
might be) the other’s anger. The primary example is the gracious royal permission to the
medieval Jewish bankers to demand interests from Christians. Those bankers (and their
fellow Jews in general) had thoroughly to suffer from this privilege. Yet, irrespective of this
closely intertwined ambivalence, privileges are throughout history and roughly all over the
globe objects of desire – after all, they grant a special status be it socially, be it economically or
however else. The combination of these two sides is likely to be the real reason why, generally
speaking, privileges are rarely addressed openly, at least not by those who are benefitting from
them; they normally try to justify their elevated status as something necessitated by some
superior order or to disguise it as something actually normal or to hide it throughout.
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I. Introduction
Speaking about privileges arouses sentiments which are not necessarily with-
out ambivalence. Even though the primary connotation might be positive, a
closer look reveals that there are also downsides. That, here too, the coin
consists of two sides is most prominently evidenced by the well known term
‘privilegium odiosum’ which indicates that the one’s elevation is (or might be)
the other’s anger. The primary example is the gracious royal permission to the
medieval Jewish bankers to demand interests from Christians. Those bankers
(and their fellow Jews in general) had thoroughly to suffer from this privilege.
Yet, irrespective of this closely intertwined ambivalence, privileges are
throughout history and roughly all over the globe objects of desire – after
all, they grant a special status be it socially, be it economically or however else.
The combination of these two sides is likely to be the real reason why, gen-
erally speaking, privileges are rarely addressed openly, at least not by those
who are benefitting from them; they normally try to justify their elevated
status as something necessitated by some superior order or to disguise it as
something actually normal or to hide it throughout.
These are old patterns of human behaviour that can be found everywhere on
the globe and over all historical periods.1 Here and now, a particular emanation
of this phenomenon can be traced in the treatment of credit institutions in law
– and this is what shall be addressed by the following remarks. To be sure, with
regard to the German legal system, credit institutions’ liabilities for correct
treatment of their customers has been – and still is – aggravated particularly by
the Private Law Federal Supreme Court’s (BGH) case law. The increasing
amount of information duties and transparency measures to be provided by
credit institutions to their customers according to this adjudication is even
close to something opposite to a privilege.2 However, if one shifts the perspec-
tive just a little bit, a privilege becomes visible in the relationship of the credit
institutions to their customers. A striking emanation3 is to be found in insol-
1 As an historical and psychological aside: the still today wide-spread fear from the evil eye
is the fear from envy; many remedies have been invented to protect oneself from such
eye’s devastating effect; for ancient Rome cf. Paulus, Römisches Eigentumsverständnis
und Aberglaube, Revue Internationale des Droits de l’Antiquitè (RIDA) XLIII 1996,
S. 283 ff.
2 See just Emmerich in: Münchener Kommentar-BGB, 6th ed., 20012, § 311, marg. no.
112 ff.; Grundmann, ibid. § 276 marg. no. 114 ff.
3 Another privilege is to be found in the deposit business of current accounts; it is com-
monly qualified as being a depositum irregulare (cf. Henssler in: Münchener Kommentar-
BGB, 6th ed., 2012, § 700 no. 15 ff.) which, pursuant to sec. 700 BGB, permits the credit
institution to use the deposed money more or less for free. This privilege opens oppor-
tunities to create new money (on this, see M.Köhler, Die Wertstabilität des Geldes als
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vency law where the fundamental baseline of equal treatment of creditors (par
condicio creditorum) is replaced by a privileged status.
It is, thus, appropriate to begin the following considerations with some
thoughts about the principle of the creditors’ equal treatment and why it is
so central for insolvency law (II). This shall be followed by the discussion of
privileges (III). In the last section (IV) some deliberations are presented that
give some cautious (and very preliminary) guidance as to how to deal with
those privileges.
II. Some thoughts about par condicio creditorum
Given its often4 proclaimed central role for insolvency law, it appears to be
appropriate to start with some thoughts about the just mentioned principle
of equal treatment of the creditors (alternatively: pari passu principle5), in
particular, whether or not it is rightfully seen as a core principle. After all,
despite its alleged centrality, there is no explicit mention to be found neither
in the German Insolvency Ordinance (InsO) nor in many other insolvency
codes around the world. Quite to the contrary, the history of bankruptcy
legislation could even be delineated as a never-ending fight for privileges.6 To
name but one example: For literally centuries,7 the sovereign as legislator has
(ab)used its power of rule-setting to grant itself as executive a bankruptcy
Inhalt der Vertragstreue und die Eigentumsgarantie, JZ 2013, 957, 962 ff.), for instance, by
means of overnight transactions such as repo-trading.
4 See just Häsemeyer, Insolvenzrecht, 4th ed., 2007, 2. 24 ff.; Prütting, Allgemeine Verfah-
rensgrundsätze der Insolvenzordnung, in: Kölner Schrift zur Insolvenzordnung, 3rd ed.,
2009, Kapitel I marg. no. 61 ff., p. 19 ff.; Brinkmann, The Position of Secured Creditors in
Insolvency, in: Eidenmüller/Kieninger (eds.), The Future of Secured Credit in Europe,
2008, 249, 250 f. Rather sceptical, however, Knospe, Scharfes Schwert oder harmlose
Gerechtigkeitsregel? – Die insolvenzrechtliche Monstranz der Gläubigergleichbehand-
lung, ZInsO 2014, 861 ff.
5 On this particular principle’s central role in the present practice of sovereign debt re-
structuring, see Sandrock, Griechenland und Zypern in der Finanzkrise: die Rechtsstel-
lung ihrer privaten Finanzinvestoren, RIW 2014, 16 ff.; Paulus, Jüngste Entwicklungen
im Resolvenzrecht, WM 2013, 489 ff.; ders., ZIP 2013, Resolvenzrecht im Werden –
NML, Inc. vs. Argentina, 2. Runde, ZIP 2013, 2190 ff. See, additionally, below text
around and footnotes 19 and 20.
6 Cf., for instance, etwa J. Bauer, Ungleichbehandlung der Gläubiger im geltenden Insol-
venzrecht, DZWIR 2007, 188.
7 See, for instance, sec. 13 of the famous Freiburg Town Charter “Nüwen Stattrecht und
Statuten der loblichen Stadt Fryburg im Pryzgow gelegen” from 1520 (drafted by Ulrich
Zasius). On this, cf. Knoche, Ulrich Zasius und das Freiburger Stadtrecht von 1520, 1957,
p. 75; Nassall, Das Freiburger Stadtrecht von 1520 – Durchsetzung und Bewährung,
1989, p. 206 ff.
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privilege8 in the form of what was called sometimes “prince’s penny” some-
times “crown’s privilege” and sometimes “fisc privilege”. Germany9 is cur-
rently one of the few jurisdictions in this world where this privilege is
(allegedly10) abolished;11 but, telling enough, the fisc fought ever since the
privilege’s abolition in 1999 until today for its re-introduction.12
1. Dogmatics
A closer look into the principle reveals that differentiations are necessary: after
all, equal treatment might refer to the procedural steps within a insolvency
proceeding or, alternatively and additionally, to the distribution process. Be-
sides of procedural rights granted to all insolvency creditors – as defined in sec.
38 InsO – who are to pursue their satisfaction exclusively within the insol-
vency procedure, sec. 87 InsO,13 suffice it to mention here the plan proceeding
alone.14 Even though this modern instrument introduces private autonomous
flexibility15 into insolvency law which has served for centuries, if not millen-
nia, as paradigm of the strict to be applied rigor iuris it obliges the drafters to
procedural equal treatment in sec. 222, 226 InsO.16
8 Informative on this, by far not unique, method H.Lang, Gesetzgebung in eigener Sache,
2007.
9 Others are, for instance, Austria (which served as model for Germany) or England.
10 Cf. J.-P. Meier, Privilegien des Fiskus und der Sozialversicherungsträger in der Unter-
nehmensinsolvenz, 2010, passim.
11 See also infra at III 2.
12 Occasionally by means which were not entirely beyond any doubt regarding their
legitimacy, cf. Vallender, Par conditio creditorum ade?, NZI 2005, 599 ff.; Marotzke,
Die Anfechtbarkeit von Vollstreckungsmaßnahmen wegen Benachteiligung konkurrie-
render Gläubiger, ZInsO 2006, 7 ff.; idem, Ketzerisches aus der ersten Instanz, ZInsO
2006, 190 ff.; ders., Der insolvenzrechtliche Gläubigergleichbehandlungsgrundsatz in
der neueren Rechtspolitik, Insolvenzjahrbuch 2007, 10 ff.; idem, Sinn und Unsinn einer
insolvenzrechtlichen Privilegierung des Fiskus – zugleich eine Stellungnahme zu Art. 3
des Haushaltbegleitgesetzes 2011 i. d. F. des Gesetzesbeschlusses des Deutschen Bunde-
stages vom 28. 10. 2010, ZInsO 2010, 2163 ff.; J.-P. Meier, Die Wiedereinführung von
Insolvenzvorrechten durch das Hauptportal, ZInsO 2010, 1121.
13 On this cf. BGH, dec. from 29 Jan. 2009 – III ZB 88/07, ZInsO 2009, 662; OLG
Stuttgart, dec, from 5 Nov. 2013 – 1 Sch 2/11, ZInsO 2014, 720, 721.
14 This is all the more permissible as there has been published only recently a comprehen-
sive study on this subject, cf. Kodek, Der insolvenzrechtliche Gleichbehandlungsgrund-
satz in vergleichender Perspektive – eine Skizze, KTS 2014, 215.
15 On the discussion about the contractual nature or facet of the insolvency plan, see
primarily Madaus, Der Insolvenzplan, 2011.
16 Madaus, ZIP 2014, 500, 506 ff., correctly admonishes the insolvency court of the Suhr-
kamp case in Berlin to take this into account when sanctioning the plan in that proceed-
ing.
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With regard to the distribution equality, above all, the abolition of privileges in
the German Insolvency Ordinance comes to mind. Following the Austrian
model (and thereafter copied by several other jurisdictions such as the English
one), sec. 38 InsO refrains from any distinction between unsecured creditors;
they share the same rank. This implies that, of all possible distribution meth-
ods in cases of a common pool problem, each creditor is to receive the same
proportional dividend.17
2. Psychology
If this more or less positivistic explanation should not suffice, at least two
others are possible: a psychological one and an economic one. As to the first,18
the question arises when, for instance, investment bankers tell that, before
going into a certain country, they examine the effectiveness and efficiency of
the local enforcement and insolvency law. Why do they do that, given the fact
they know perfectly well that their investment might yield profit or might be
lost? What is it that makes them want to be treated in the worst case scenario of
an insolvency proceeding efficiently and effectively? The return will anyway
be low if not zero.
It is my assumption that here is a fundamental feeling of fairness at stake which
behavioural economists have made likely decades ago when they started to
examine all over the world the result of the so called ultimatum game.19 Two
test-persons were put together and one of them was given 5 100 with the order
to divide this money between her and the other test-person in whatever pro-
portion. When and if the other test-person agrees to that distribution they
both were allowed to keep the money. Otherwise they would have to return it
to the investigator. The economists expected as result that this division would
be something like 5 1 for the other person and the original recipient of the
money would keep 5 99. After all, the other one would receive 5 1 for just
saying “okay”.
17 On this, cf. Paulus, Freiheit und Gleichheit als Grenzmarkierung zwischen Zivilrecht
und Insolvenzrecht, in: Beuthien/Fuchs/Roth/Schiemann/Wacke (eds.), Perspektiven
des Privatrechts am Anfang des 21. Jahrhunderts – Festschrift für Dieter Medicus zum
80. Geburtstag, 2009, p. 281 ff.
18 As to what follows, see Paulus, Ist das Insolvenzrecht wirklich eine Schlüsselmaterie für
die Wirtschafts- und Finanzstabilität eines Landes? – Der Versuch einer Antwort, in:
Dahl/Jauch (eds.), Festschrift für Klaus Hubert Görg, 2010, p. 361 ff.
19 The literature has grown endlessly; therefore, just as an “appetizer” Lehrer, Wie wir
entscheiden – Das erfolgreiche Zusammenspiel von Kopf und Bauch, 2009, 232; Sieg-
mund / Fehr / Nowak, Teilen und Helfen – Ursprünge sozialen Verhaltens, Spektrum
der Wissenschaft – Dossier, issue 5 / 2006, p. 55.
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However, the factual result was almost diametrically opposed to that expect-
ation – and has been repeated over and over again all over the globe: If the
original recipient would not offer either half of the 5 100 or something close to
50 %, the other one would reject (fifty-fifty is a wide-spread distribution
scheme but there are some regions in the world with a different understanding
of fair distribution). The conclusion drawn from this game is the assumption
that humans do have a fundamental feeling for fairness. It is not icy egoism that
dominates exclusively inter-human cohabitation but there is also a kind of
sensibility for the others’ expectations and one’s own adjusted behaviour to
them.
If this conclusion is valid – after all the game has been tested around the world
innumerable times ever since – one might be justified to see here an explan-
ation for the importance of an efficient insolvency proceeding. After all, it
appears to comply with a fundamental feeling of justice that of all distribution
methods the equal sharing is the most appropriate one. If I have to suffer a loss
due to my debtor’s inability to pay me, such loss should be also borne in the
same way by my co-creditors. To be sure, the loss is part of the business risk;
however, this risk should be transparent and fairly distributed between all
stake-holders.
It is in this context that the uneasiness begins with quite a famous case engag-
ing in these days the courts of the United States.20 As of now, it seems as if
NML Capital, commonly called a vulture fund, will receive full satisfaction
whereas other creditors of Argentinian bonds who have consented to a hair-
cut will receive only partial satisfaction. The issue at stake is the exact meaning
of the pari passu principle21 which is just another term of art for the equal
treatment of creditors. The creditor, NML, who has bought bonds at a steep
discount due to the dropped prices in the wake of restructuring efforts of the
debtor, Argentina, and its subsequent agreements with creditors on a reduc-
20 NML Capital, Ltd. vs. Argentina, see above at fn 5. For NML’S efforts in Europe cf.
Audit, Sovereign Bonds and National Relativism: Can New York Law Contracts Safely
Cross the Atlantic?, forthcoming Capital Market L.J. 2014; available at: http://paper-
s.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2396856.
21 On this clause, cf. Olivares-Caminal, To Rank Pari Passu or Not to Rank Pari Passu:
That is the Question in Sovereign Bonds After the Latest Episode of the Argentine
Saga,15 Law and Business Review of the Americas 2009, 745 ff.; idem., The Pari Passu
Interpretation in the Eliott Case: A Brilliant Strategy but an Awful (Mid-Long Term)
Outcome? 39 Hofstra Law Review 2011, 39 ff. Additionally, Panizza, Do We Need a
Mechanism for Solving Sovereign Debt Crises? A Rule-Based Discussion, sub II, in:
Paulus (ed.), A Debt Restructuring Mechanism for Sovereigns – Do We Need a Legal
Procedure?, to appear in 2014. See also Chabot/Gulati, Santa Anna and His Black Eagle:
The Origins of Pari Passu?, available at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?ab-
stract_id=2397929.
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tion of the face value are now claiming payment in full and seem to succeed.
The courts (and the law?) make this success of selfish behaviour – champerty –
possible but leave a bad after-taste.
3. Economics
A final approach to understanding the key function of the par condicio cred-
itorum is an economic one. Accordingly, the question to be raised in the
beginning is a hypothetical: what if there were no insolvency law at all? In
such a scenario, it is to be assumed that the best informed creditors would
receive full satisfaction whereas the others would be left with little or nothing.
The priority principle prevails which allows the first to come to become served
first – in full. This means there is no equality at all in distribution. Supposing
the above given psychological explanation as being valid, it is further quite
likely that potential creditors would abstain from investing into the particular
debtor unless granted full transparency from the debtor. But as a whole, it is to
be assumed that the risk of belonging to the “losers” would in most if not all
cases be calculated as being too high. Historical and present day examples can
serve as proof: In 151222 the town fathers of Antwerp – then the economic
capital of entire Europe – wrote a letter to the later emperor Charles V. asking
him for permission to enact a bankruptcy law. Their argument was that other-
wise the “dear foreign merchants” would leave the city since they lost too
much to unfaithful debtors. The permission to enact such law not only gave
birth to a remarkable piece of legislation but also initiated a wave of bank-
ruptcy legislation that stretched from other Dutch cities to France (Lyon) and
England (Henry VIII). The modern example is the inclusion of “insolvency
and creditor rights” into the elaterin compendium of twelve key standards
established by the Financial Stability Board.23 The purpose of that list is, in the
words of the Board’s website:
The Compendium of Standards lists the various economic and financial standards that are interna-
tionally accepted as important for sound, stable and well functioning financial systems. The
international community attaches much importance to the adoption and implementation of these
standards because of their beneficial effects on the stability of financial systems both inside
countries and globally.
This means that this Board is of the opinion that a modern and effective
insolvency regime is key for a prospering economy all over the world. The
UNCITRAL Legislative Guide describes this as:
22 On this, see more elaborate Paulus, Ein Kaleidoskop der Geschichte des Insolvenz-
rechts, JZ 2009, 1148 ff.
23 Cf. http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/cos/key_standards.htm.
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Insolvency laws and institutions are critical to enabling States to achieve the benefits and avoid the
pitfalls of integration of national financial systems with the international financial system. Those
laws and institutions should promote restructuring of viable business and efficient closure and
transfer of assets of failed businesses, facilitate the provision of finance for start-up and reorgan-
ization of businesses and enable assessment of credit risk, both domestically and internationally.24
Whereas the total lack of an insolvency system, thus, would lead to rather
unpleasant economic consequences, let us assume what it means within a
functioning and effective insolvency system to have a privileged position.
Privilege in this context means to get full satisfaction even within an insol-
vency proceeding before any one of the general unsecured creditors receives
any dividend. The insolvency risk, thus, is mitigated and the respective cred-
itor can be more relaxed in observing and controlling his or her debtor. It was
exactly this relaxation which had served the German legislator as argument to
abolish the fisc privilege25 and to impose the position of a general unsecured
creditor on tax authorities pursuant to sec. 38 InsO. Since tax authorities are
usually the first to recognize a person’s inability to pay its obligations. Being
equipped with a privilege they could be mild and adopt a wait-and-see policy.
In the effort to come to earlier commencements of insolvency cases, the “tax-
non-payment” indicator was supposed to become instrumentalised and to
have the tax authorities filing earlier a petition.
The relaxation issue is what will be addressed below (at C II) when the priv-
ilege of close-out netting will be discussed. Therefore, it should be kept in
mind for now that privileges imply a diminution of the need to control the
debtor. This is not in itself good or bad; to be sure, the control can possibly
impede the debtor’s activities and transform it into a puppet-on-the-string of
the creditor – a phenomenon well known in company and tax law (shadow
director etc.). On the other hand, to impose control duties on, for instance, the
debtor’s workers would mean to burden them with the more than unpleasant
task to possibly deprive themselves from the cow that feeds them, as it were.
But there are certainly creditors that are particularly apt to exercise such
control. We will come back to this.
Finally, let us have a look at the equal treatment principle, the par condicio
creditorum. Here, creditors do bear the insolvency risk – however, they all
share this fate.26 In order to minimize the risk, yet, they will check carefully
with whom they enter into transactions and, once done so, they will monitor
the debtor closely in order to have the chance to react quickly in case of need.
This is all the more imperative as there is additionally the shadow of insol-
24 Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law, 2005, p. 9 and 10.
25 Cf. Balz/Landfermann, Die neuen Insolvenzgesetze, 2nd ed., 1999, p. 161 f.
26 On this, see also Skeel/Jackson, Transaction Consistency and the New Finance in Bank-
ruptcy, 112 Columbia L.R. 152, 185 ff. (2012).
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vency’s avoidance powers at stake: transactions in the period of three months
preceding the petition are subject to a more (sec. 131, 132 InsO) or less
(sec. 130 InsO) strict regime of recovery.27 Thereby, the principle of equal
treatment is extended into the period prior to the commencement of the case.28
The consequence therof is that creditors, from a point of time unknown ex
ante, share an obligation towards each other to respect the interests of the co-
creditors. It is perfectly understandable that individual creditors do see this
imposition as a major impediment to their activity; after all, control does not
come for free. However, abstracting from the individual creditors the check
and balance system between debtor and creditors has its advantages for the
general good.29 An effective insolvency system exercises, thus, a disciplinary
function of the market participants and provides incentives for responsible
lending and borrowing.30
The alternative to such a creditor-monitoring system would be that state
authorities or whichever other institutions do such monitoring. To a certain
degree, this is the very task of the rating agencies;31 and there have been – and
there still are – numerous jurisdictions which, as a matter of fact, do employ
such state institutions.32 However, not only that this demands an enormous
bureaucracy and creates, thus, considerable costs; it depends also very much
on the size of the particular country how effective such authority can work.
III. Privileges
Speaking about privileges in the German insolvency law might be somewhat
surprising. Since it is one of the outstanding achievements of the German
Insolvency Ordinance from 1999 that claimed to have realized the par condicio
creditorum by having abolished all privileges, including (and in particular) the
27 On the present discussion on the right balance of the German rules on avoidance see, for
instance, Marotzke, Vertrauensschutz kontra Gesamtgläubigerinteresse – Gedanken zu
Auslegung und Reform des Insolvenzanfechtungsrechts, ZInsO 2014, 417 ff.
28 See below fn. 54.
29 It might be noted as an aside that the Islamic finance law prohibits a lender to earn
interests by the mere elapsing of time. Instead, to make profit the lender has always to
bear a certain risk.
30 On these issues cf. Paulus, The Interrelationship of Sovereign Debt and Distressed
Banks: A European Perspective, 49 Tex. Int’l L.J., 201 ff. (2014).
31 See just Schroeter, Ratings – Bonitätsbeurteilungen durch Dritte im System des Finanz-
markt-, Gesellschafts- und Vertragsrechts, 2014. Cf., additionally, G. Wagner, Die Haf-
tung von Ratingagenturen gegenüber dem Anlegerpublikum, FS Blaurock, 2013,
p. 467 ff.
32 In Mexico, for instance, it is the ministerio público’s task to file petitions whenever it
discovers need.
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abovementioned fisc privilege. A closer look, however, reveals that this abo-
lition was not complete; some survived this legislative cap33 and of them,
(only34) three shall be addressed here in what follows.
1. Set-off
It appears to be fair to conclude from the aforegoing discussion that the
principle of the creditors’ equal treatment in their debtor’s insolvency is fun-
damental and that, consequently, exceptions from this principle need thorough
and convincing justification. Having, thus, laid some ground regarding the
wisdom and fundamentality of this principle, we can now turn to the priv-
ileges which are more or less evidently granted to credit institutions. Thereby,
I distinguish between the simple set-off rule (I) and the more advanced close-
out netting (II). In order to complete the picture, a few observations about a
different set of privileges for such credit institutions will be addressed (III)
before some remarks about desirability or necessary changes of the present
situation are to conclude the present paper (D).35
Sec. 94 InsO allows any insolvency creditor (as defined in sec. 38 InsO) to sett-
off his claim against the debtor’s claim when and if, at the time of the proceed-
ing’s opening, such set-off right existed through statutory or contractual per-
mission.36 Sec. 95 and 96 InsO modify and restrict this right to a certain degree
but leave the general principle intact. Without going too deeply into it, I still37
see this general principle as expressed in sec. 94 InsO as a privilege – not
exclusively,38 to be sure, but primarily – for financial institutions. Since just
33 See, in addition to supra fn. 10, Henckel, Die letzten Vorrechte im Insolvenzverfahren,
in: Prütting/Vallender (eds.), Insolvenzrecht in Wissenschaft und Praxis, Festschrift
Uhlenbruck, 2000, S. 19 ff.
34 But see infra at I 4 regarding the current account.
35 A subsequent paper will address some aspects of the evolution of the close-out netting
privilege: Paulus, Multinationale Unternehmen und nationale Insolvenzrechte, ZIP
2014.
36 On the various shapes of the right to set-off in different jurisdictions, cf. Zimmermann,
Die Aufrechnung – Eine rechtsvergleichende Skizze zum Europäischen Vertragsrecht,
in: Beuthin (ed.), Festschrift für Medicus, 1999, p. 707 ff.
37 See already Paulus, Zum Verhältnis von Aufrechnung und Insolvenzanfechtung, ZIP
1997, S. 569 ff.; idem, Banken und Insolvenz – eine internationale Betrachtung, ZBB
2002, 492, 494; idem, Rechtspolitisches und Rechtspraktisches zur Insolvenzfestigkeit
von Aufrechnungsvereinbarungen, in: Canaris u. a. (eds.), 50 Jahre BGH, Festgabe der
Wissenschaft, Bd. III, 2000, p. 765 ff.
38 Tax authorities might also benefit quite extensively from this privilege when and if they
have a claim against the debtor.
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by looking at the very basic factual situation underlying this rule, one recog-
nizes quickly the dramatic improvement of a creditor’s situation who is in the
position to set-off over his fellow-creditors without this right or possibility.
Those facts are that there are two persons (or entities) D and O who happen to
be at the same time their mutual creditor and debtor:
1.) Mutual obligations
If the obligation of the insolvency debtor (D) would be to deliver shoes to the
other party (O), whereas – entirely independently on this obligation – O
would happen to be obliged to clean D’s garden, it is evident that O has to
lodge his claim regarding the delivery of shoes as a monetary claim and that he
will receive a dividend. In turn, since the garden cleaning duty is not based on
an executory contract, O still would have to fulfill his obligation in toto. O is
here in a rather unpleasant situation to be bound to deliver in full but to receive
only a part (the dividend) of what is owed to him.
2.) Obligations connected by a synallagmatic contract
Things change, however, if both obligations were stemming from one and the
same synallagmatic contract (in US terminology: executory contract39) which
happens to be not yet completely fulfilled by either side. Here the estate-
favoring rule of sec. 103 InsO would apply. Accordingly, D’s administrator
is granted the choice between termination or continuation of the contract; the
decision is entirely dependent on an assessment of the economic advantages
and disadvantages for the estate. In this case, O would have at least a chance of
better treatment even though with only very limited rights to influence the
administrator’s decision.40
3.) Set-off
Finally, if both obligations happen to be payment obligations, the creditor O is
in the best possible situation given the fact that his debtor is in an insolvency
proceeding: By “sacrificing” his claim he can get full satisfaction on his own
without being dependent on anyone’s choice or decision! Full satisfaction is
otherwise granted only to creditors with a right to separation (Aussonderung),
and it should be noted that, under German law, no stay applies to exercising
the right to set-off!41
39 Sec. 366 US Bankruptcy Code (BC); on this, cf. Countryman, Executory Contracts in
Bankruptcy, 57 Minn. L.R. 439 (1973).
40 See sec. 103 InsO (cf. http://www.iuscomp.org/gla/statutes/InsO.htm#s103) :
41 This is different from sec. 553, 362(a)(7) BC.
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It is true, however, that sec. 94 bestows the right to set-off to all payment
creditors; nevertheless, the typical beneficiary of this privilege are quite cer-
tainly banks. Again, looking to this right from this angle and to set it in
correlation to creditors in a very similar position it appears to be not too easy
to find a dogmatic and just explanation for this privileged treatment.42 Never-
theless, it is accepted as if it were a superior rule of nature!
4.) Current account
Be it noted for the present context as well as for the subsequent one of Close-
out Netting that even less explicable irregularities are also taken for granted:
Sec. 355 HGB (= Trade Law Code) provides for the current account (Konto-
korrent) for which it is accepted that all receivables within this relationship are
to be deemed as legally non-existent and being replaced by only one claim
which remains on balance of all those “non-existent” claims. Insolvency law
does accept this artificial (if not fictional) disappearance of otherwise full-
fledged claims and concentrates on the one remaining balance claim.43 This
is what might be called a “hidden privilege”; it is not especially adapted to the
needs of the financial industry but rather to those of entrepreneurialship.
2. Close-out netting
a. Definition and elements
The technical term of netting comprises different meanings: there is the settle-
ment netting, the novation netting, and the close-out netting (in German:
Liquidationsnetting). Only the latter shall be addressed in what follows as
this form of netting is by far the most wide-spread one and carries with it
the most important implications in cases of insolvency; after all, it serves as a
protective shield for the gigantic market of derivatives, swaps, repurchase
contracts (“repos”) and other new financial products trading which had in-
creased almost exponentially in the years preceding the last financial crisis.
This protective function is more than likely to be the reason why this type of
netting is quite unique in being pushed forward by hard and constant lobby
work. It is in particular the International Swaps and Derivatives Association
42 There are some attempts, cf., for instance, Jeremias, Internationale Insolvenzaufrech-
nung, 2004, p. 117 ff., 123 f.; Peitsch, Die Insolvenzaufrechnung, 2001, p. 157 ff.
43 Just see Brandes/Lohmann, MüKo-InsO, 3rd ed., § 96 marg. no. 32. On a broader
perspective, see also Hirte, Gegenstand vs. Wert – Von den Schwierigkeiten des Un-
ternehmensrechts mit der zivilrechtlichen Dogmatik, FS Hofmann-Becking, 2013,
p. 531 ff.
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(ISDA)44 that serves here as a never resting promoter of further improvements
of risk-alleviations of such netting agreements.45
The exact definition of close-out netting seems to be hard to give. One exam-
ple is that it means “the determination of the debt owed after the netting of the
market values of all pending obligations and offsetting that final result with
outstanding payments and deliveries, if existent.”46 An alternative and more
exhaustive example is given in art. 2 par. 1 lit n) of the Directive 2202/47/EC of
the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 June 2002 on financial
collateral arrangements (Finanzsicherheitenrichtlinie):
‘close-out netting’ provision means a provision of a financial collateral arrangement, or of an
arrangement of which a financial collateral arrangement forms part, or, in the absence of any such
provision, any statutory rule by which, on the occurrence of an enforcement event, whether
through the operation of netting or set-off or otherwise:
(i) the obligations of the parties are accelerated so as to be immediately due and expressed as an
obligation to pay an amount representing their estimated current value, or are terminated and
replaced by an obligation to pay such an amount; and/or
(ii) an account is taken of what is due from each party to the other in respect of such obligations,
and a net sum equal to the balance of the account is payable by the party from whom the larger
amount is due to the other party
The mechanism resembles the abovementioned account current as defined in
sec. 355 HGB: Like there, the result is in both cases that a multitude of
obligations and claims are merged into one remaining claim. And it is only
this one that ultimately is to be served. Unlike the account current, however,
such merger takes place at a close-out netting agreement not in certain time
44 Cf. www.isda.org. In its own words, its achievements are: “Since its founding in 1985,
the International Swaps and Derivatives Association has worked to make over-the-
counter (OTC) derivatives markets safe and efficient. ISDA’s pioneering work in devel-
oping the ISDA Master Agreement and a wide range of related documentation materi-
als, and in ensuring the enforceability of their netting and collateral provisions, has
helped to significantly reduce credit and legal risk. The Association has been a leader
in promoting sound risk management practices and processes, and engages construc-
tively with policymakers and legislators around the world to advance the understanding
and treatment of derivatives as a risk management tool.” On ISDA, see also Jordan (ed.)
International Capital Markets, 2014, p. 17 (2.19), 31 (3.01), 270 (11.09).
45 See Soltysinski, The Demise of the Principle of Equality of Economic Actors in Private
Law, in: Govaere/Hanf (eds.), Scrutinizing Internal and External Dimensions of Euro-
pean Law, Liber Amicorum Paul Demaret Vol. 1, 2013, p. 423, 429 ff.; Schwarcz/Sharon,
The Bankruptcy-Law Safe Harbor for Derivatives: A Path-Dependence Analysis, 71
Washington and Lee L.R. 1, 18 (2014).
46 Jahn/Fried, MüKo-InsO, 3rd ed. 2013, § 104 marg. no. 152 (translated by the present
author). See also Berger, Lösungsklauseln im Insolvenzfall, in: Kölner Schrift zum In-
solvenzrecht, 3rd ed., 2009, p. 325, 342 f.; v.Hall, Insolvenzverrechnungin bilateralen
Clearingsystemen, 2010, 149 ff.
ECFR 4/2014 The Wonderful World of Privileges 543
intervals but on the event of an enforcement occurrence. The determination of
such an occurrence has contractually to be fixed. The same is true for the
consequences, but in this regard there are usually two alternatives chosen:
either automatic termination or the need for a declaration to terminate. The
“Rahmenvertrag für Finanztermingeschäfte” (German Master Agreement for
Financial Derivative Transactions) provides in its No. 7(2):47 “The contract
terminates without declaration in case of insolvency. Such case is given when
and if a bankruptcy or insolvency petition is filed with regard to one party and
this party has either filed the petition herself or if she is illiquid or in a situation
that justifies the opening of such a proceeding.”
Accordingly, the netting mechanism is composed of several elements: (1) the
termination of all pending, i.e. not yet fully performed transactions covered by
the Master Agreement, (2) the valuation of each party’s claims on the basis of
hypothetical or real replacement transactions (expressed in monetary terms),
and (3) the final offsetting of all covered positions with the result of one single
claim for one of both contractual parties (in the money).48
b. Insolvency law
Taking the stance of the abovementioned wisdom of the pari passu principle (B
III 3), the close-out netting clause and its effects make some bells ringing in the
head of an insolvency lawyer. Not only that this clause is a classic example for a
so called ipso-facto clause,49 the right to termination does also raise issues of an
insolvency administrator’s avoidance powers.
a.) Ipso facto-clauses are definitely attractive for many (if not all) contract
parties; after all, they provide a possibility to escape from the harsh conse-
47 “Der Vertrag endet ohne Kündigung im Insolvenzfall. Dieser ist gegeben, wenn das
Konkurs- oder ein sonstiges Insolvenzverfahren über das Vermögen einer Partei bean-
tragt wird und diese Partei entweder den Antrag selbst gestellt hat oder zahlungsunfähig
oder sonst in einer Lage ist, die die Eröffnung eines solchen Verfahrens rechtfertigt.” A
similar rule is provided for, for instance, in No. 6(1)(b), 2nd sent. of the European Master
Agreement. Further references at Jahn/Fried (as in previous fn), marg. no. 166 f.
48 Cf. Schneider, Netting und Internationales Insolvenzrecht, in: Kohler/Obermüller/Wit-
tig (eds.), Kapitalmarkt – Recht und Praxis, Gedächtnisschrift für U. Bosch, 2005,
p. 197, 198.
49 On this clause, in the general insolvency context, Jacoby, Lösungsklauseln in der In-
solvenz, ZIP 2014, 649 ff.; Paulus/Berberich, National Report for Germany, in: Faber/
Vermunt/Kilborn/van der Linde (eds.), Treatment of Contracts in Insolvency, 2013,
9.109 ff.; Berger (as in fn. 46), p. 325 ff.; Paulus, Verbindungslinien zwischen Insolvenz-
recht und Privatautonomie, in: Prütting/Vallender (eds.), Insolvenzrecht in Wissen-
schaft und Praxis, Festschrift Uhlenbruck, 2000, p. 33, 45 ff.
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quences of the egalitarian insolvency proceeding. But since insolvency law is
predominantly irremediable a conflict arises between its mandatory applica-
tion and the contractual possibility. A closer look into German insolvency law
reveals that the resolution of this conflict has many shades.50 However, the
general rule is sec. 119 InsO pursuant to which agreements are invalid when
and if they deprive the insolvency administrator of, i.a., its right51 to choose
between termination and continuation of a contract. Based on this rule and its
underlying policy, the German Supreme Court52 has decided only recently
that ipso facto clauses in energy-supply contracts are invalid.
b.) The abovementioned close-out netting clause displays another insolvency
pitfall, its potential avoidability by the actio Pauliana. After all, this time-
honored insolvency instrument53 is designed in a way to prevent certain pre-
insolvency activities, particularly those from strong creditors, which effec-
tuate a benefit for them when compared with their fellow creditors and their
equal treatment in an insolvency proceeding. Accordingly, these avoidance
powers serve, among others, the purpose of applying the par condicio cred-
itorum already in the pre-commencement period.54 Thus, if the counterparty
of a close-out netting agreement is given the right to terminate the contract
one might assume that any exercise of such right by a creditor is subject to
avoidability. This is all the more likely as the avoidance powers of German
insolvency law have reached a level of aggressiveness by now which creates a
50 Cf. Jacoby (as in previous fn). See, additionally, IMF, Orderly and Effective Insolvency
Procedures – Key Issues, 1999, p. 39.
51 Sec. 103 InsO (as in fn. 40).
52 BGH, Dec. from 15 November 2012 – IX ZR 169/11, ZIP 2013, 274; with comment by
Huber, Unwirksamkeit von insolvenzbedingten Lösungsklauseln – Vertragspraxis, was
nun?, ZIP 2013, 493; Knof, Insolvenzbedingte Lösungsklauseln auf dem Prüfstand, DB
2013, 1769; Löffler, Insolvenzabhängige Lösungsklauseln ade? – Auswirkungen der
BGH-Rechtsprechung auf Energielieferungs-Rahmenverträge, BB 2013, 1283; Klie-
bisch/Linsenbarth, Insolvenzsicherung bei Rahmenverträgen über Finanzterminge-
schäfte im Lichte der BGH-Entscheidung zur Unwirksamkeit insolvenabhängiger Lö-
sungsklauseln, DZWIR 2013, 449; Braegelmann, Insolvenzabhängige Lösungsklauseln
im Visier des BGH, KSI 2013, 259; Wellensiek/Scharfenberg, Das Ende von insolven-
zabhängigen Lösungsklauseln für Energielieferungsverträge – Übertragbarkeit auf das
Bauvertragsrecht bei Vereinbarung der VOB/B?, DZWIR 2013, 317. On EFETsee infra
in fn. 59.
53 See Willems, Actio Pauliana und fraudulent conveyances, 2012, p. 20 ff.; additionally,
Ankum, De Geschiedenis der “Actio Paulina” (l’histoire de l’action Paul#Imitpunkt#-
enne), 1962; Grevesmühl, Die Gläubigeranfechtung nach klassischem römischen Recht,
2003.
54 On this very recently, see Bork, Anfechtung als Kernstück der Gläubigergleichbehand-
lung, ZIP 2014, 797 ff.
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broad front of lobbying for a drastic cut-back of these powers (the end of
which efforts are as of now still an open issue).55
c.) However, sec. 104 InsO56 rescues financial institutions from these and from
further risks. Not only that this rule excludes the administrator’s right to
choose between termination and continuation – in the common banking par-
lance: the cherry picking right57 (note that this very “cherry picking” is – on
purpose! – permitted against all other counterparties outside of financial con-
tracts! it is actually seen as one of the essential peculiarities of almost any
insolvency law!) –;58 this rule is commonly understood and interpreted as
additionally excluding an administrator’s avoidance powers, too. It is argued59
that the exclusion of the administrator’s right of choice implicitly excludes also
any detriment for the creditors when and if a termination right is applied. This
is essential as, pursuant to sec. 129 InsO, any avoidability is dependent on a
legal act with a detrimental effect for the general unsecured creditors; accord-
ingly, without detriment there is no avoidability.
But it is not just this domestic rule that guarantees protection. The German
legislator did not fail to comply with the order expressed in art. 7 of the
abovementioned Financial Collateral Directive:
1. Member States shall ensure that a close-out netting provision can take effect in accordance with
its terms:
(a) notwithstanding the commencement or continuation of winding-up proceedings or reorgan-
isation measures in respect of the collateral provider and/or the collateral taker; and/or
(b) notwithstanding any purported assignment, judicial or other attachment or other disposition of
or in respect of such rights.
55 Cf. Marotzke, Vertrauensschutz kontra Gesamtgläubigerinteresse – Gedanken zu Aus-
legung und Reform des Insolvenzanfechtungsrechts, ZInsO 2014, 417 ff.; idem, Formu-
lierungsvorschläge für eine “kleine” Reform des Insolvenzanfechtungsrechts, ZInsO
2014, 745 ff. See, additionally, Paulus, Zur Auslegung anfechtungsrechtlicher Vorschrif-
ten, FS G.Fischer, 2008, p. 445 ff.
56 It is worthwhile noticing that this section entered into force as early as 1994, whereas
most of the rest of the Insolvency Ordinance did so 1999!
57 Just see Obermüller, Insolvenzrecht in der Bankpraxis, 8th ed., 2011, p. 668 (3.1001);
Schneider (as in fn. 48), p. 198; Soltysinski (as in fn. 45), p. 427.
58 Cf. Berger (as in fn. 46), p. 346 ff.; Jahn/Fried (as in fn. 46), § 104 marg. no. 169 f.;
Köndgen in: Kübler/Prütting/Bork, InsO-Kommentar, § 104 marg. no. 39, 42.
59 Jahn/Fried (as in fn. 46), § 104 marg. no. 170 b; Zimmer/Fuchs, Die Bank in Krise und
Insolvenz, ZGR 2010, 597, 634. Against: Köndgen in: Kübler/Prütting/Bork, InsO-
Kommentar, § 104 marg. no. 39, 42. A broad discussion will be found in Riewe, Die
EFET-Rahmenverträge für den Handel mit Strom und Erdgas – Standard-Vertragsbes-
timmungen auf dem Prüfstand des deutschen und des internationalen Privatrechts
(Diss., forthcoming in 2014), at Chapter 4 E.
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2. Member States shall ensure that the operation of a close-out netting provision may not be
subject to any of the requirements that are mentioned in Article 4(4), unless otherwise agreed
by the parties.
Leaving aside the last paragraph with its surprising preponderance of agree-
ments over insolvency rules (we will come back to this shortly in the context
of the proposed art. 6 a European Insolvency Regulation (EIR)), it is also
remarkable to read the self-imposed obedience of the European legislator
towards the finance industry: Member states are to exempt close-out netting
effects – as described supra – from any insolvency impediments. The principles
of insolvency law are to step back from the business concept of that industry!
To say the least: that is quite unique and unusual.
Because insolvencies have nowadays cross-border effects to an increasing
degree, the mandate of that art. 7 of the Financial Collateral Directive has to
be fulfilled in this regard, too. The German legislator did so in sec. 340 InsO
and in art. 102 b of the Einführungsgesetz zur Insolvenzordnung.60 But also
the German Indenture Bond Act (Schuldverschreibungsgesetz = SchVG) has
in its sec. 19 par. 1, 2nd s. a respective rule so that the protection is rather all-
encompassing. But obviously not enough yet: Since the European legislator,
too, is kept busy with protective work. Not only that art. 25 of the Credit
Institutions’ winding-up Directive61 has netting agreements governed by the
lex contractus rather than the lex concursus; the same shall now be inserted as
art. 6 a into the revised EIR.
The latter is noteworthy in at least two aspects: Firstly, the exclusion of the
otherwise applicable lex concursus opens avenues for choosing a particularly
close-out netting friendly law and almost urges the participants, thus, to do
what the rest of the EIR explicitly tries to suppress – namely forum shop-
ping!62 Secondly, when and if the special credit institutions’ insolvency legis-
lation contains already a respective rule (the abovementioned art. 25), and
when and if the EIR explicitly excludes such financial institutions from its
applicability,63 it is irritating that such a rule shall nevertheless be included into
the EIR. This raises suspicion that the use of the protection for close-out
netting is benefitting no longer just financial institutions but many more
60 The originally envisaged sec. 104 a InsO became never adopted; cf. Jahn/Fried (as in
fn. 46), § 104 marg. no. 180 m.
61 Directive 2001/24/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 April 2001 on
the reorganisation and winding up of credit institutions
62 Cf. Recital 4 of the EIR: It is necessary for the proper functioning of the internal market
to avoid incentives for the parties to transfer assets or judicial proceedings from one
Member State to obtain a more favourable legal position (forum shopping).
63 Cf. art. 1 par. 2 EIR.
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who manage to fall under the definition of this form of netting. We will come
back to this below sub e).
d.) Close-out netting experiences, thus, a special insolvency treatment. To get
the entire picture visible, however, it is still necessary to explain as to how this
special treatment constitutes a privilege. This becomes particularly evident by
looking at a hypothetical (taken from Virgós/Garcimartín64) which demon-
strates the enormous reduction of the general insolvency risk – meaning the
risk to suffer a loss from one’s counterparty’s insolvency:
A and B have entered into several derivative transactions, for example multiple interest rate swaps.
Numerous mutual payment obligations result from these transactions. If B defaults on one of
them, a close-out netting arrangement allows A (i) to terminate all transactions early, (ii) to assess
the value of each transaction (some of which may have a positive replacement value and others a
negative one), and (iii) to offset these amounts. Let us imagine that the parties have entered into
three transactions: Transaction 1 and 2 had a positive value for B of 8 (B was “in the money”) and
transaction 3 had a positive value for A of 10 (A was “in the money”). In this example, the
reciprocal payment obligations are computed so as to result in a single payment obligation of B
to A: A only has to receive 2 from B instead of paying 8 and requesting 10 from B.
Expressed in real life figures, the actual savings are even more impressive than
those given in the hypothetical: According to Paech,65 the benefits for the year
2009 (more precisely: June of that year) are as follows: The nominal total
amount of globally all OTC finance services added up to 605 trillion USD.
The gross risk of non-payment of these financial services would have
amounted to 25 trillion USD. The existence of close-out netting agreements
and their insolvency proofness, however, reduced the net non-payment risk to
3,7 trillion USD.66 Indeed, this instrument is quite effective in achieving what
it is designed for: the reduction of the insolvency risk!
e.) At this point, it should have become sufficiently clear that the treatment of
close-out netting agreements under German (and many other countries’) in-
solvency law(s) constitutes, in fact, a privilege. This, in and for itself, could be
seen as sufficient reason to oppose it for principal reasons. After all, when the
Insolvency Ordinance proclaimed the complete abolition of privileges and
64 Virgós/Garcimartín, Close-out netting, Insolvency and Resolution of Financial Insti-
tutions in the EU: A Conflict of Law Analysis, in: Santen/van Offeren (eds.), Perspec-
tives on international insolvency law – A tribute to Bob Wessels, 2014, p. 151, 153.
65 Paech, Netting, Finanzmarktstabilität und Bankenrestrukturierung – Die Notwendig-
keti eines internationalen zivilrechtlichen Standards, Wertpapier-Mitteilungen (WM)
2010, 1965, 1966 with reference to par. 117, 118, 139, 188 of the BIS paper ‘Strengthening
the resilience of the banking sector, Dec. 2009; available at: http://www.bis.org/publ/
bcbs164.pdf?noframes=1.
66 See also Paech (as in previous fn), p. 1966 (reduction of the otherwise necessary securi-
tization to 15 %).
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when even the tax authorities have been deprived of their previous privilege
why then should financial institutions keep it.67
As justifiable as such approach might be, the opposition yet can be grounded
on much more solid ground and on much harder facts. To discover them, it is
necessary to bear in mind the seemingly banal fact that those who benefit from
that privilege are human beings and share, therefore, with all others certain
behavioural patterns which display the potential of a downside; here we come
back to what has been stated supra at B III 3. It is a well known fact that
privileges induce those who enjoy it to riskier behavior and reduced attention,
and those who do not enjoy it to get nevertheless “a piece of the cake”.
It is, thus, not really surprising to find all these (and a few more) behavioral
patterns in a list in a Note compiled by the Secretariat of UNCITRAL’s Work-
ing Group V. 68 This UN Commission has recently – in December 2013 –
discussed on occasion of a public conference whether future work should be
devoted to the role of close-out netting and the safe harbors in the general
insolvency context. In preparation for this event the said Note states that the
insolvency proofness of close-out netting agreements might cause the follow-
ing effects:
– the risk that creditors who are not true financial counterparties side step the
insolvency process;
– possible disincentives to monitor the credit strength of trading partners;
– the potential incentive to frame transactions as financial contracts and
obtain a de facto undisclosed security interest;
– the potential unfairness to the general body of creditors (i.e. the inequitable
distribution of insolvency loss) and harm to the estate;
– the risk of abuse of the insolvency process by “empty creditors” (whose
economic interests diverge from their right to vote their claim) and poten-
tial harm to restructuring attempts; and
– the risk of expansion of exemptions beyond their intended scope.
The issues quoted are those that the secretariat has spotted in its preparatory
work for this conference. Not only that obviously attempts are made69 to
67 Or even: have it extended! On this, see Schwarcz/Sharon (as in fn 42) for the evolution of
the privilege in the USA. A similar study on the German development is to appear later
this year by the present author.
68 Cf. A/CN.9/WG.V/WP.117, p. 13 ff, available at: http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/
UNDOC/LTD/V13/871/05/PDF/V1387105.pdf?OpenElement.
69 As a matter of fact, big law firms nowadays have teams of lawyers whose primary task it
is to design contracts in a way that they fall under the safe harbor exceptions.
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define certain transactions and agreements in a way that they fall under the
protective shield originally designed exclusively for the benefit of credit in-
stitutions70 – this “explains” why the abovementioned (sub c) special norm
shall be included in the European Insolvency Regulation (art. 6a71) –; those
risky behaviors include also what is commonly known as moral hazard.
What might be seen from an academic perspective as a theoretical issue has
been subject to intensive research. The result of which is that moral hazard and
its dangerous implications is not only real; it is, as a matter of fact, also one of
the most prominent triggers for the last global financial crisis of 2008 – it has
been shown (most impressive by Prof. Roe72) that the failures of Bear Stearnes,
AIG, and Lehman Brothers73 were facilitated and acerbated by the safe harbor
rules in the insolvency legislation.74 They undermined market discipline in the
foregoing years and there are only few indications, if any, that this has changed
ever since.
c. Privileges as a lender for sovereigns
Seen from an academic insolvency law perspective one wonders how it is
possible that in a Code which was enacted with the explicit pride of having
abolished all privileges and having established the time-honored principle of
the creditors’ equal treatment such a super privilege not only has been kept but
also so far never been seriously disputed. Leaving aside the hearsay rumor of
the existence of around 1700 respective lobbyists in Brussels alone, another
privilege for financial institutions comes to mind which has insolvency impli-
cations insofar as it elevates those institutions in the area of “too big to fail”.
To be sure, legislators in the larger financial centres of this world have reacted
to the last crisis and have enacted endless new legislations dealing with the
70 See, for instance, the discussion at Jahn/Fried (as in fn. 46), § 104 marg. no. 174 ff.
71 On this legislative proposal, see the opposing statement of the Belgium and French
delegation from 6 March 2014 – 7377/14 (JUSTCIV 64; CODEC 672) as being in certain
contradiction with the intentions of the proposed EU Bank Recovery and Resolution
Directive.
72 Roe, The Derivatives Market’s Payment Priorities as Financial Crisis Accelerator, 63
Stan. L. Rev. 539 ff.; idem, Derivatives Markets in Bankruptcy, Comp. Econ. Studies
2013, 519 ff.
73 It is said that the chaotic close-outs in mid-September 2008, i.e. around the bankruptcy
filing of Lehman, had cost this bank something like 50 billion Dollars in value.
74 See, in addition to Roe (as in fn. 72), Skeel, Bankruptcy Boundary Games, 4 Brook.
J. Corp.Fin. & Com. L., p. 1 ff (2009); Lubben, Repeal the Safe Harbors, 18 Am. Bankr.
Inst. L.R. 319 ff. (2010); Skeel/Jackson (as in fn 26), p. 166 ff.; Soltysinski (as in fn. 45);
Schwarcz/Sharon (as in fn. 45).
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rescue and liquidation of financial institutions. However, when the European
and the German legislator alone have introduced and planned more than 65
legislative projects since 200875 and when these efforts are still ongoing, sus-
picion arises that this hyperactivity misses the point. Innumerable new instru-
ments rarely achieve the goal (too many cooks spoil the broth). The alleged
goal is rather clear: to prevent systemic effects when a bank fails and to inhibit
the tax payer from paying for the failures of bankers.
But there is a complication in this scenario which makes it rather difficult to
achieve this goal. The very legislator who is in charge of finding clear rescue
and winding-up solutions for failing banks has a fundamental interest in saving
them.76 Since sovereigns, at least within the European Union, are heavily
dependent on banks as their lenders. In order to foster this relationship, the
borrowing sovereign uses its powers as legislator to grant several privileges to
the financial institutions which make this borrower particularly attractive for
lending businesses.77 Suffice it to mention the so called large exposure regime
(LER):
See art. 111 of Directive 2006/48/EC:78
A credit institution shall not incur an exposure, after taking into account the effect of the credit risk
mitigation in accordance with Articles 112 to 117, to a client or group of connected clients the
value of which exceeds 25 % of its own funds.
This is a prudent provision based on the insight that dependency on a single
customer might lead to dangerous consequences. However, only two articles
further down, art. 113 establishes exemptions – one of them being lending to a
central government! This is an invitation gladly accepted by many financial
institutions to adhere to what is commonly known as a “home bias” of bank
lending, i.e. being exposed to one’s home central government to 80 or even
90 %! The pernicious consequence of such home bias is, however, a procycli-
cality in times of crises such as the one experienced in Europe since 2010. They
have shown the interrelatedness of failing banks knocking down sovereigns –
and vice versa.
75 Cf. Höche, Bankenregulierung zur Bewältigung der Finanzmarkt- und Staatsschul-
denkrise, in: Bankenregulierung, Insolvenzrecht, Kapitalanlagegesetzbuch, Honora-
rberatung – Schriftenreihe der Bankrechtlichen Vereinigung vol. 35, 2013, p. 3 ff.
76 On the following, see already Paulus, Staatenpleiten und Bankenpleiten: eine gewollte
Mesalliance, KTS 2013, 155 ff.; idem (as in fn. 29).
77 Very informative in this context the report presented by the Wissenschaftlicher Beirat
des Bundesministeriums der Finanzen from February 2014: Der Staat als privilegierter
Schuldner – Ansatzpunkte für eine Neuordnung der öffentlichen Verschuldung in der
Europäischen Währungsunion (accessible in internet).
78 Directive 2006/48/EC of the European Parliament and the of the Council of 14 June
2006 relating to the taking up and pursuit of the business of credit institutions.
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Under these conditions it is hard to believe that those 65 (and more) legislative
activities reallywill solve theproblem.The legislator iscaught insomethingakin
to a conflict of interest. An effective expulsion of a bank from the market might
cause that same legislator’s insolvency! Therefore, it is to be feared that the “too
big to fail” issue will remain on the agenda for quite some time to come.
VI. Conclusions
Any realistic approach to the issues addressed in the preceding pages has to
encounter that a simplistic call for abolition of all those privileges would cause
catastrophic consequences. If the present system stands at all to improvements
– be it remembered that the once intended introduction of a privileged status
for licences by means of the envisaged sec. 108 a InsO was fiercely contested79
and repelled as being in breach of the basic principle of the par condicio
creditorum80 –, they should certainly be made carefully and step by step.
But they definitely should be done!
One of these improvements would be the reduction and ultimate abolition of
the LER. Another one would the examination of the consequences of a re-
striction of the privilege for close-out netting in insolvency law. After all, the
study of Skeel and Jackson81 demonstrates that not much would change when
offsetting would be permissible furtheron as well as unavoidability of Master
Agreements when entered into prior to the suspect periods of the general
avoidance rules. A third option would be to have the financial institutions
pay (at least something) for enjoying their privileges.82
But the very first step of all such improvements is to become aware of the mere
existence of such privilege. As banal as this statement might sound, it is not an
79 See just v. Wilmowsky, Gegen einen § 108 a InsO für Lizenzverträge – Die Pflichten des
Lizenzgebers (Vermieters, Verpächters) nach Überlassung des Gegenstands zur Nut-
zung, NZI 2013, 377 ff. See, however, an application of a not uncommon tactics within
Europe in Holzer, Die Arbeiten der UNCITRAL zur Insolvenzfestigkeit von Lizenz-
verträgen, NZI 2014, 337 ff.
80 Note that the most recent decisioning of the BGH, dec. from 19 July 2012 – I ZR 70/10,
ZIP 2012, 1561 – M2Trade; dec. from 19 July 2012 – I ZR 24/11, ZIP 2012, 1671 – Take
Five, might ultimately lead to making the discussion obsolete when and if it becomes
clarified that licence rights are to be seen as rights in rem, cf. Hirte, Sublizenzen in der
neueren Rechtsprechung des I. Zivilsenats des BGH – und ihre Auswirkungen auf die
Debatte um die Insolvenzfestigkeit von Lizenzen, ZInsO 2013, 1770 ff.
81 As in fn. 25.
82 Cf. Perotti, Systemic liquidity risk and bankruptcy exceptions, DSF Policy Paper, No. 8,
2010; idem, The Roots of Shadow Banking, 2013. Note that the underlying idea of this
proposal coincides with what has been said supra (in fn. 30) about Islamic finance law:
there, too, diligence is imposed on lenders by exposing them to a personal risk.
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easy task. Since all these abovementioned privileges are quite carefully hidden
in overly complicated rules, constructions, and systems.83 It appears as if this is
a strategy which has been quite successful up to now. The time seems to be ripe
to come here, too, to greater transparency and equality.
83 See already Paulus (as in fn. 76), p. 158 ff.; moreover, Schwarcz, The Functional Regu-
lation of Finance (available at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstrac-
t_id=2437544) referring in fn. 73 to Bucheit, Did We Make Things Too Complicated?,
27 Int’l Financial L. R. 24 (2008).
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